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Abstract
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) operators are responsible for maintaining security in various applied settings. However,
research has largely ignored human factors that may contribute to CCTV operator error. One important source of error is
inattentional blindness – the failure to detect unexpected but clearly visible stimuli when attending to a scene. We compared
inattentional blindness rates for experienced (84 infantry personnel) and naı¨ve (87 civilians) operators in a CCTV monitoring
task. The task-relevance of the unexpected stimulus and the length of the monitoring period were manipulated between
participants. Inattentional blindness rates were measured using typical post-event questionnaires, and participants’ real-
time descriptions of the monitored event. Based on the post-event measure, 66% of the participants failed to detect salient,
ongoing stimuli appearing in the spatial field of their attentional focus. The unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus was
significantly more likely to go undetected (79%) than the unexpected task-relevant stimulus (55%). Prior task experience did
not inoculate operators against inattentional blindness effects. Participants’ real-time descriptions revealed similar patterns,
ruling out inattentional amnesia accounts.
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Introduction
Reliance on Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance is
increasing [1–3]. Surveillance operators are responsible for
maintaining the security of critical infrastructure (e.g., airports
and government buildings) and public spaces (e.g., streets and
shopping malls). Research on CCTV has typically evaluated
technological effectiveness (e.g., image quality; see [2]), operators’
ability to match CCTV images of culprits with live or
photographed suspects (e.g., [4]), or the impact of CCTV
prevalence on crime rates and public perceptions of security
(e.g., [5]). While the importance of human factors in CCTV
operating has been identified [6,7], research investigating human
performance in the CCTV monitoring context is scarce [2,8]. This
is surprising as ineffective monitoring can have serious conse-
quences. The failure to detect criminal targets or events and
intervene appropriately not only facilitates criminal activity but
also fosters negative public perceptions of and apathy towards
security measures. We investigated the effects of three factors (i.e.,
inattentional blindness, sustained attention and prior task experi-
ence) on CCTV monitoring performance.
While CCTV systems are often used for post-hoc analyses of
events [9], real-time monitoring is essential for public protection,
and operational responses must be initiated when illegal activity is
detected. According to Scott-Brown and Cronin [9], the key to
successful real-time monitoring is to maximize detection for
unexpected events. However, research demonstrates the limits of
humans’ capacity to detect and identify unanticipated target
stimuli. For example, Wolfe, Horowitz, and Kenner [10]
examined error rates in artificial simulated luggage-screening task.
At the prevalence of 50% (i.e., targets were presented in 50% of
trials) the ‘miss’ rate was 7%. However, when prevalence rates
dropped to 10% and 1% of trials, miss rates rose to 16% and 30%,
respectively (see also [11,12]). These error rates raise questions
regarding the effectiveness of participants’ real-time monitoring
ability, and highlight difficulties associated with the detection of
unexpected events. Here, we discuss how one particular
attentional phenomenon – inattentional blindness – may contrib-
ute to detection failures.
Inattentional blindness refers to a failure to detect unexpected
stimuli, even when these stimuli are conspicuous. When attention
is directed toward a primary task, observers may fail to perceive
otherwise salient visual features of their environment [13].
Inattentional blindness has been demonstrated both in basic
perception tasks (e.g., [13]) and for complex, dynamic stimuli (e.g.,
[14,15]).
In their classic demonstration of inattentional blindness, Simons
and Chabris [15] showed participants footage of two teams of
three individuals moving and passing a basketball. Participants
were instructed to count the number of passes made by one of the
teams. After approximately 50 seconds, either a woman with an
umbrella or a person wearing a gorilla suit walked through the
game. Of the 192 participants, 46% failed to detect these
unexpected events (56% failed to detect the gorilla, 35% failed
to detect the woman). More recently, Chabris, Weinberger,
Fontaine and Simons [16] demonstrated inattentional blindness in
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real-world conditions. Participants ran after a confederate,
counting the number of times the confederate touched his head.
At night, 65% of participants failed to notice a staged fight taking
place along the running route. During the day, 44% of a second
set of participants failed to notice the fight. These findings
demonstrate that individuals engaged in a primary task often fail to
notice otherwise salient stimuli in their environment if these stimuli
are not relevant to the primary task.
These findings demonstrate the importance of inattentional
blindness for CCTV monitoring, where the ability to detect and
monitor events is essential. However, to our knowledge, no
research has directly investigated the topic. Stedmon, Harris, and
Wilson [17] found that a high percentage of participants
monitoring CCTV footage failed to detect a significant event,
and discussed their finding with a brief, post-hoc reference to
inattentional blindness (although the authors actually referred to
change blindness, the phenomenon under discussion would be
more appropriately described as inattentional blindness [18]).
However, while Stedmon et al.’s findings may indicate inatten-
tional blindness in a CCTV monitoring context, their research
was not a direct exploration of the issue, and boundary
conditions for inattentional blindness require further examina-
tion.
We examined inattentional blindness in real-time CCTV
monitoring, and explored three potential boundary conditions
for inattentional blindness in this setting, selected on the bases of
their theoretical and applied value. Specifically, we investigated
the effects of (a) the relevance of the unexpected event to the
primary task, (b) length of sustained attention, and (c) operators’
prior task experience on inattentional blindness rates. Research
suggests that unattended stimuli that share features with task-
relevant stimuli are less likely to produce inattentional blindness
than those that do not [19]. Models of visual selective attention
demonstrate that visual stimuli must compete for attentional
resources (e.g., [20–22]). Folk, Remington, and colleagues [23,24]
found that, in basic perception tasks, attentional control settings
and attention capture are largely contingent on task demands.
Further, Braun and Julesz [25] argued that observers are able to
detect and discriminate items outside their attentional focus, but
that stimulus saliency (influenced by observer expectation)
determines the level of visual processing that a stimulus receives
(see [26]). Similarly, Most, Scholl, Clifford and Simons [27]
reported that the most influential factor affecting detection of
unexpected objects is the individual’s attentional set (i.e., the
individual’s readiness to receive specific type of information). If
task goals determine individuals’ attentional sets and influence
their readiness to perceive stimuli, unexpected but task-relevant
stimuli would be predicted to elicit lower levels of inattentional
blindness (i.e., higher detection rates) than unexpected task-
irrelevant stimuli. We explored this by manipulating the task-
relevance of our unexpected stimuli. Our primary task required
participants to monitor simulated CCTV footage for ‘suspicious’
activity, and verbalize any suspicious activity detected (as if
reporting their observations to a colleague approaching the scene).
The unexpected stimulus was either an individual entering the
scene and placing a package on the ground before exiting the
scene (task-relevant), or a pirate (of the eye-patch and parrot variety)
entering and exiting the scene (task-irrelevant). Given the prevalence
of warnings relating to unattended baggage and parcels in public
places (and the relative scarcity of pirates in public places), we
expected the package-related stimulus to be of greater relevance to
the primary, security-oriented task.
CCTV operators are often required to sustain attention over
extended time periods [28]. Thus, sustained vigilance is funda-
mental to effective monitoring performance. However, research
has repeatedly shown that detection rates decrease over time in
applied monitoring settings. For example, train drivers become less
likely to detect vital railway signals [29], and CCTV operators are
more likely to miss vital visual information [8]. Parasuraman et al.
[30] reported that detection of threat-related targets (i.e., an
individual reaching for/using a gun vs. a hairdryer) also declines
over time under visually degraded conditions (but not under non-
degraded conditions). While these performance declines are
thought to reflect increased cognitive workload, Surette [31]
argued that real-time monitoring might lead to intense feelings of
boredom. Consequently, critical events might be missed as a result
of inattention. Previous inattentional blindness research has
exclusively involved sequences that take place over relatively short
time periods. For example, the clips used in Simons and Chabris’
[15] study were 75 s long. To advance this area of research and
increase its applied relevance, we investigated the effects of
sustained monitoring on inattentional blindness by manipulating
the length of footage participants were required to monitor.
Participants monitored footage for either 2 or 43 minutes
(approximately).
The vulnerability of experienced (cf. naı¨ve) operators to
inattentional blindness has not been extensively investigated.
However, Memmert [32] showed Simons and Chabris’ [15]
gorilla video to participants who had either played basketball for
more than ten years or who were novices to the game.
Experienced basketballers were significantly more likely to detect
the gorilla, compared to novices. Further, when an individual
practices the primary task (e.g., tracking basketball passes) prior to
a critical trial (i.e., a trial including the unexpected event),
inattentional blindness rates decline (see [33,34]). Similar to
expertise, prior task experience is thought to reduce the attentional
demands of the primary task (i.e., cognitive load), increasing the
attentional resources available for detecting and processing the
unexpected event [27,35,36]. Our operationalization of operator
experience differed from those reported above. Previous oper-
ationalizations reflect experience in the activity being monitored
(e.g., playing basketball), or training with the specific stimuli being
monitored. We operationalized experience in terms of prior
experience monitoring CCTV footage. Recent research by Drew,
Vo, and Wolfe [37] suggests that prior monitoring-task experience
may, at least partially, attenuate inattentional blindness effects.
Drew et al. had experienced radiologists and naı¨ve operators
monitor a series of chest computed tomography (CT) slides for the
presence of lung nodules. During the series, an unexpected
stimulus (an image of Simons & Chabris’ gorilla) faded into and
out of visibility. While scanning for lung nodules, 83% of
experienced operators and all of the naı¨ve operators failed to
report detecting the unexpected stimulus, demonstrating clear
inattentional blindness despite detection rates near ceiling (88%)
under control conditions. However, while both experienced and
naı¨ve operators showed evidence of inattentional blindness, Drew
et al.’s findings suggest that prior task experience may offer some
(albeit limited) protection against detection failures. Basic detection
research also demonstrates that prior experience with a task
paradigm can protect against declines in detection performance
associated with the attentional demands of executing a concurrent
monitoring task (e.g., [38]). Braun found that participants with
‘‘extensive prior experience with tachistoscopic displays’’ (p.424)
but no training specific to that particular experiment outper-
formed novice participants in a ‘Popout’ detection task. Further,
detection performance for experienced participants was compa-
rable to performance for participants who received substantial
training specifically related to that experiment (trained participants
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completed thousands of practice trials prior to data collection).
Braun argued that extensive prior experience with a task may
facilitate a ‘‘relatively direct route from preattentive processing to
perceptual report’’, improving experienced observers’ perfor-
mance (cf. novice observers) under conditions of increased
attentional load (p.425; see also [39], for perceptual encoding
advantages related to expertise). Prior experience with the general
task paradigm did not protect against the effects of increased
attentional load in all conditions, but it produced results similar to
task-specific training. Given that task-specific training has been
shown to reduce inattentional blindness, prior experience with the
task may offer similar benefits. Braun demonstrated that
manipulations designed to impair basic processes underlying
target detection can differentially affect experienced and novice
participants. However, the generalizability of these basic effects to
more applied monitoring tasks has not been empirically assessed.
Thus, we compared levels of inattentional blindness in a group of
CCTV novices with a group of experienced CCTV operators
(infantry personnel who monitor CCTV footage in a professional
security setting). Prior monitoring-task experience may improve
detection rates by facilitating more efficient monitoring/search
strategies, reducing task difficulty and associated cognitive
processing demands, or through effects on observer expectations
[37–39].
Our methodology emulated Simons and Chabris’ [15] with two
important modifications. First, our stimulus clip included simulat-
ed criminal activity designed to be relevant to a CCTV monitoring
setting. Second, our primary task required participants to verbalize
any observed aggressive and suspicious behavior. Inattentional
blindness is typically assessed by establishing a primary task and
then asking participants, after viewing the stimulus clip, if they saw
the unexpected target while completing the primary task (e.g.,
Simons and Chabris asked participants a series of cued recall
questions including ‘‘Did you see a gorilla?’’). Unavoidably, this
method of measuring inattentional blindness assesses participants’
memory for seeing the unexpected stimulus. This is distinct from
assessing whether or not the participant detected the unexpected
stimulus at the time it was presented, and memory errors may
inflate inattentional blindness rates (cf. [15]). In addition to using a
post-event recall measure, we analyzed participants’ verbalizations
to determine whether or not the unexpected stimulus was reported
during real-time monitoring. This innovative approach provided a
measurement of inattentional blindness free of any memory-
related effects (cf. [40]).
Based on previous research demonstrating inattentional blind-
ness, we expected to find inattentional blindness in the current
study (Hypothesis 1). Previous research has implicated attentional set
and task demands in inattentional blindness. Thus, we hypothe-
sized that an unexpected task-relevant stimulus would be detected
more often than an unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus (Hypothesis
2). Further, given that detection rates typically decrease as the
length of the monitoring period increases, we expected levels of
inattentional blindness to be higher for participants viewing the
longer version of the footage, compared to those viewing the
shorter version (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we compared the perfor-
mance of experienced and naı¨ve CCTV operators. Stimulus-
specific training has been shown to reduce inattentional blindness,
and detection research has demonstrated that task familiarity and
stimulus-specific training offer similar benefits (cf. non-trained,
naı¨ve participants) for detection under conditions of increased
attentional load. However, it is unclear if these findings will
generalize to the present context.
Methods
Ethics statement
The Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee,
University of Portsmouth, UK, reviewed and approved this
experimental protocol. Participants provided full written consent
prior to participating and were fully debriefed upon completion.
Participants and Design
We used a 2(naı¨ve vs. experienced operator) 62(CCTV clip
length: 2 vs. 43 minutes) 62(stimulus relevance: relevant vs.
irrelevant) between-subjects design. The experienced operators
were 88 infantry personnel stationed overseas on active duty, who
regularly monitor CCTV footage as part of their duties. This
group was comprised of males aged 18 to 37 years (M= 23,
SD= 4). CCTV monitoring experience ranged between 1 and
19 years (M= 5, SD= 4). On average, infantry personnel may be
expected to monitor CCTV footage for four to eight hours per
month. Using the conservative estimate, this equates to an
approximate range of 48 to 912 hours of monitoring experience
(M = 250, SD = 204). Experienced operators participated on a
voluntary basis. 88 students and staff (67 female) were recruited
from a UK university as the novice group. Ages ranged from 18 to
57 years (M= 24, SD= 10). Participants in the novice group had
no experience monitoring CCTV footage. Students earned course
credit and staff participated on a voluntary basis. Five participants
failed to follow instructions (did not comply with the primary,
verbalization task) and were excluded from analyses. The final
sample consisted of 171 participants (84 experienced and 87 naı¨ve
operators). Within each level of operator experience, participants
were randomly allocated to clip length and stimulus relevance
conditions.
Materials
Two stimulus clips were produced for this study. Four females
and one male, aged between 19 and 24, were recruited as actors.
Each clip involved a primary event and an unexpected (task-relevant
or -irrelevant) stimulus. The primary event lasted 50 seconds and
was filmed in daylight in an alleyway. To permit comparison with
Simons and Chabris’ [15] stimuli, our clips included a dynamic
primary event involving a group of people interacting. Simons and
Chabris [15] reported that observers were less likely to detect the
gorilla (a dark-colored stimulus), when the attended basketball
team was dressed in white (i.e., when basic visual features differed
between the attended event and the unexpected stimulus). In our
event, actors in the primary event were dressed in dark clothing
and the unexpected target was dressed in light clothing.
The primary event featured a female (A) arriving at the location
with a bike. Subsequently, two other females (B and C) and a male
(D) arrived. A acted aggressively (e.g., pushing) towards B, C, and
D (and vice versa). Subsequently, A interacted with C and D to
execute an apparent drug deal, while B stole A’s bike. After
approximately 30 seconds of interaction, the unexpected stimulus
entered the shot. In the relevant condition, a female walked halfway
across the back of the scene, placed a suspicious parcel on the
ground, stood up, looked straight into the camera, and walked off.
This stimulus was deemed relevant to the task as CCTV operators
will often look for suspicious packages left in public places. In the
irrelevant condition, the same female appeared in the back of the
scene wearing a pirate’s costume (light clothing, a pirate hat, eye
patch and a parrot on her shoulder). The pirate entered scene,
looked straight into the camera and exited. In both versions, the
unexpected stimulus was visible for 9 seconds and, after the target
had exited, the four other individuals ran off. Actors in the primary
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event did not engage with, or appear to notice, the target.
Rehearsal prior to recording ensured parity between the two clips.
Pilot testing confirmed that participants were able to detect the
unexpected target (e.g., pirate or woman with a parcel) under
conditions of full attention. 20 participants (10 each for task-relevant
and -irrelevant stimuli) viewed the short version of the event, and
were asked to attempt to detect the pirate/woman with a parcel.
Detection rates were perfect.
Clip length was manipulated by adding footage prior to the
primary event, and involved three stages. First, we filmed the
critical event (including the appearance of the unexpected target).
Second, we filmed an additional 42 minutes of footage of the area
where the critical event took place. Third, we added this additional
footage to the beginning of the critical event. For the long clip
condition, we simply combined these two lots of footage (i.e.,
added 42 minutes footage at the beginning of the critical event).
For the short clip condition we added only the final one minute of
the 42 minutes additional footage to the beginning of the critical
event. The additional footage showed non-target pedestrians
walking through the alleyway at sporadic intervals. Although the
monotony of this footage may have encouraged lapses in attention,
it provided a realistic approximation of common conditions under
which operators are required to sustain vigilance [31]. For the
short clips, the additional footage contained no non-target
individuals. The additional footage for the long clips contained
17 non-target individuals. Short clips were 1 minute and
50 seconds in duration and long clips lasted for 42 minutes and
50 seconds. In all conditions, the unexpected target entered shot
20 seconds before the footage ended. All clips were muted. These
stimulus materials are available online at https://
openscienceframework.org.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually either on university
premises (novices), or at the army base (experienced operators).
Prior to viewing the clip, participants were instructed to imagine
being a CCTV operator responsible for the security of an outdoor
location. Anything that could potentially be a threat to security, for
example aggressive or suspicious behavior, was to be described
verbally (into a Dictaphone), in real-time, to a (hypothetical)
colleague ‘on the ground’. Pilot testing confirmed that participants
could understand and follow the instructions.
Clips were presented in color, in full screen on 15 or 20 inch
monitors. Screen size varied within conditions, and did not affect
detection rates. After viewing the footage participants completed a
short questionnaire. In an effort to ensure that participants who
detected the unexpected stimulus would report it, questions were
structured to probe for increasingly detailed responses. Further, to
counter demand effects inherent in the leading nature of the
questions asked, and to verify the accuracy of any ‘yes’ responses
(i.e., indicating that the unexpected stimulus had been detected),
participants were required to provide details of what they had
seen. Participants in the relevant conditions were also asked




Audio files were transcribed verbatim. Transcript content was
used to verify task engagement. Five participants failed to verbalize
anything relating to the critical event, and their data was
discarded. The remaining 171 participants all verbalized at least
one sentence relating to the critical event. Transcripts also allowed
an alternative method of testing for inattentional blindness (cf. the
post-event recall measure).
Participants’ answers were coded for (i) whether the unexpected
stimulus was detected/undetected, and (ii) correct/incorrect
description of stimulus. Two raters initially coded 34 (approxi-
mately 20%) of the questionnaires. Discrepancies were identified
and resolved via discussion. Following agreement on the initial 34
questionnaires the two raters split the remaining 137 question-
naires. The dataset for this experiment is available online at
https://openscienceframework.org.
Gender ratios clearly differed between the experienced and
naı¨ve operator groups. However, crosstabulation analyses within
the naı¨ve group data found no significant gender differences on
any measure of detection, x2 (1, N= 87) ,0.859, p..431, strongly
suggesting that gender differences between groups did not
contribute to the results obtained.
Post Event Measures of Inattentional Blindness
Of the 171 participants, 66% (SE= 4) did not report detecting
the unexpected stimulus. This finding demonstrates inattentional
blindness in the context of CCTV monitoring, supporting
Hypothesis 1. Table 1 displays the percentages of participants
failing to detect the unexpected stimulus in each condition.
A 2(naive vs. experienced operators) 62(clip length) 62(rele-
vance) hierarchical loglinear analysis [41] on detection rates (based
on the recall measure) identified a significant association between
stimulus relevance and inattentional blindness. Supporting Hy-
pothesis 2, participants were less likely to detect the task-irrelevant
unexpected stimulus compared to the task-relevant unexpected
stimulus, x2 (1, N=171) = 10.53, p,.001, w= 0.25. Based on
Cohen’s criteria, this represented a small-moderate effect. The
non-significant Relevance6Clip length6Operator Experience
interaction, x2 (1, N=171) = 1.60, p= .207, indicated that the task-
relevant stimulus was detected more often than the task-irrelevant
stimulus across conditions. Clip length was not significantly
associated with inattentional blindness, x2 (1, N=171) = 0.19,
p= .665, w = 0.03, and there was no significant difference between
Table 1. Percentage (SE) of Experienced and Naı¨ve Operators
Failing to Detect the Unexpected Stimulus According to Clip
Length and Event Relevance, Based on the Post-Event





Length % (SE) na % (SE) na
Experienced Long 64 (10) 22 80 (9) 20
Short 57 (11) 21 71 (10) 21
Overall 61 (7) 43 76 (7) 41
Naı¨ve Long 41 (10) 22 91 (6) 21
Short 59 (10) 22 73 (10) 22
Overall 50 (8) 44 81 (6) 43
Overall Long 52 (8) 44 85 (6) 41
Short 58 (8) 43 72 (7) 43
Overall 55 (5) 87 79 (5) 84
aThis value refers to the total number of participants in the cell, not to the
number of participants who failed to detect the target.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086157.t001
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experienced and naı¨ve operators, x2 (1, N=171) = 0.11, p= .746,
w = 0.02. Given the large range in operator experience, two sets of
crosstabulation analyses compared detection performance within
the experienced operator group. Median split analyses revealed no
systematic or significant differences in detection rates between
subsets. Similarly, when analyses compared operators with greater
(N = 16) or less (N = 68) than 10 years experience, any differences
were small and non-significant (p..118, w,0.18).
Closer inspection of the data revealed an interesting trend.
Some participants reported detecting the unexpected stimulus, but
failed to correctly identify it (e.g., describing it in one case as a
‘‘man with a saxophone’’). This suggested that participants may have
detected the unexpected stimuli, but that the strict criterion for
detection being applied – requiring that participants be able to
detect and accurately identify/describe the stimuli – may have
inflated inattentional blindness rates (this ‘‘detection without
identification’’ phenomenon is addressed in more detail below).
A more lenient coding scheme – where any reference to a
character in the background was coded as a positive detection of
the stimulus – increased detection rates. However, inattentional
blindness was still evident: 39% (SE= 4) of participants failed to
detect the unexpected stimulus. A 2(operator experience)6 2(clip
length) 6 2(relevance) hierarchical loglinear analysis again
revealed a significant, moderate-strength association between
relevance and detection rates, x2 (1, N=171) = 15.62, p,.001,
w= 0.50. As above, the task-irrelevant unexpected stimulus was
significantly more likely to go undetected (54%, SE= 5) than the
task-relevant unexpected stimulus (24%, SE= 5). No other associa-
tions were significant, x2 (1, N=171) ,3.67, p..055.
Analyses of Inattentional Blindness Based on Transcripts
Participants may have detected the unexpected stimulus during
the event but, for various reasons, failed to report it on the post-
event questionnaire. To address this issue we coded transcribed
verbalizations for mention of the unexpected stimulus. Again, we
used both strict and lenient criteria for detection. Analyses based
on the strict coding scheme produced results consistent with those
reported for the post-event measures. Overall, 80% (SE= 3)
participants failed to verbalize detection of the unexpected event,
and the task-irrelevant event was more likely to go undetected (89%,
SE = 3) than the task-relevant event (70%, SE = 5), x2 (1, 171)
= 9.65, p= .002, w= 0.24. All other associations were non-
significant, x2 (1, 171) ,1.74, p..187. Analyses based on the
lenient coding scheme again found inattentional blindness – 57%
(SE= 4) of participants failed to detect the target – but found no
significant difference between inattentional blindness rates for the
task-irrelevant (60%, SE = 5) and task-relevant events (54%, SE = 5),
x2 (1, 171) = 0.782, p= .376, w= 0.07. All other associations were
also non-significant, x2 (1, 171),2.29, p..130. Figure 1 presents a
summary of relevance effects across analyses.
Detection without Identification
A number of participants detected the unexpected stimulus but
were unable to correctly identify it. We calculated detection
without identification rates (i.e., cases for which the strict criterion
indicated inattentional blindness but the lenient criterion indicated
detection) based on both verbalization and post-event recall data.
McNemar’s test (a repeated samples analysis for non-parametric
data) found no significant differences between overall detection
without identification rates (i.e., as a proportion of the total
number of trials) based on verbalizations (22%, SE = 3) compared
to post-event recall questionnaires (28%, SE = 3), McNemar’s x2 (1,
171) = 2.27, p= .132. However, detection without identification
accounted for a significantly greater proportion of detection
failures on the post-event recall questionnaires (41%, SE = 5),
compared to the verbalization data (26%, SE = 4), McNemar’s x2
(1, 110) = 9.32, p= .003.
Discussion
We demonstrated inattentional blindness for naı¨ve and expe-
rienced CCTV operators using both real-time verbalization
measures and post-event recall measures of detection. Further,
the effect persisted even when more lenient criteria for detection –
representing a more conservative test of inattentional blindness –
were applied. Inattentional blindness rates were lower (detection
rates were higher) when the unexpected stimulus was relevant to
the primary monitoring task than when the unexpected stimulus
was irrelevant to the primary monitoring task. However, contrary
to expectations, inattentional blindness rates did not increase when
the task required longer periods of monitoring. Importantly, both
experienced and naı¨ve operators demonstrated inattentional
blindness. Detection rates based on the post-event questionnaire
were higher than those based on the transcripts, supporting
previous work (e.g., [15,42]) suggesting that inattentional blindness
cannot be attributed to memory failure (cf. inattentional amnesia,
[40]). These findings extend previous research (e.g., [15]) to
demonstrate that inattentional blindness is a robust phenomenon
in applied monitoring contexts, and that observer expectations
influence detection rates. First, we discuss the effects of our
manipulations on inattentional blindness rates, and relevant
theoretical and applied implications. Second, we explore applied
and methodological issues arising from data gathered using
multiple methods for measuring inattentional blindness.
Testing Boundary Conditions for Inattentional Blindness
Consistent with the predicted role of task demands and observer
attentional set, inattentional blindness rates were higher for the
task-irrelevant unexpected stimulus than the task-relevant unexpected
stimulus. Across comparisons, the associations between task-
relevance and inattentional blindness rates were generally small-
to-moderate in size (cf. comparisons based on lenient coding of
participants’ verbalizations). These findings extend those from
basic perception and discrimination research (e.g., [23,24,38]) to
show that top-down processing contributes to inattentional
Figure 1. Inattentional blindness rates according to event
relevance. Percentage of participants failing to detect the unexpected
stimulus according to event relevance based on questionnaire (Q) and
transcript (T) data, using both strict and lenient coding schemes. Error
bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086157.g001
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blindness for complex dynamic stimuli in applied contexts. In the
present study, participants’ attentional set is likely to have centered
on security-related suspicious activity. This attentional set would
permit attending to the woman placing a suspicious parcel on the
ground (i.e., the relevant stimulus), but filter out the pirate (the
irrelevant stimulus). According to this view, participants failed to
detect the pirate because they did not expect to see her.
Alternatively, dissimilarities in the movements (cf. task-rele-
vance) of the two unexpected stimuli may have contributed to the
observed difference in inattentional blindness rates. The (task-
irrelevant) pirate entered the scene, stood still, and then exited the
scene. In contrast the (task-relevant) woman with the parcel
entered the scene, bent down to place the parcel on the ground,
stood up, and then stood still before exiting the scene. However, it
is unlikely that this movement alone would account for such a
notable effect. Simons and Chabris [15] found similar detection
rates when their unexpected target (gorilla) stopped mid-way
through the scene and thumped his chest (50%) and when the
gorilla simply walked through the scene (42%). Thus, differences
in inattentional blindness are not accounted for solely by minor (or
even major) variations in target movement. Further, the same
actor served as the task-relevant and -irrelevant stimuli and, thus,
these stimuli were matched on other perceptual qualities (e.g.,
color, size, body shape, general features). This strongly suggests the
contribution of observer expectation and task demands (cf.
properties of the stimulus itself) to the inattentional blindness
rates observed. Importantly, however, even task-relevant targets
were vulnerable to inattentional blindness effects. Further, and
extending previous work by Drew et al. [37], this pattern held for
experienced operators.
We found no evidence that prior experience with the
monitoring task inoculated operators against inattentional blind-
ness. In previous research showing that operator experience can
reduce susceptibility to inattentional blindness, experience has
referred to either familiarity with executing the task being
monitored (e.g., playing basketball), or training in the primary
monitoring task with stimuli that are highly similar or identical to
those used in the critical trial, prior to being exposed to the critical
trial. In contrast, experienced operators in the current study were
recruited on the basis of their general experience in CCTV monitoring
(cf. [37,38]). While they were trained in, and had prior
occupational experience of, monitoring security footage, they
were not familiar with the specific stimulus materials used in this
experiment. On this note, Howard et al. [43] had trained and
naı¨ve operators rate CCTV footage for perceived suspiciousness,
and found greater uniformity of ratings among trained (cf. naı¨ve)
operators. The researchers suggested that this increased uniformity
may indicate that training teaches operators ‘‘what to look for’’.
Thus, experience monitoring CCTV footage in military contexts may
teach operators what to look for in military contexts, but any
associated benefits for detection performance may not extend to
other monitoring contexts. Thus, similar to benefits related to
expertise, the benefits of task experience may be highly specified
with regard to context.
Demonstrating that general experience with monitoring tasks
did not attenuate inattentional blindness has both theoretical and
applied implications. From a theoretical standpoint, it prompts
consideration of potential mechanisms underlying inattentional
blindness. If inattentional blindness is a function of individuals’
finite cognitive resources (i.e., the attentional demands of the
primary task prevent the detection of the unexpected target),
general familiarity with the task either does not (a) reduce the
attentional demands of the primary task or (b) alter the allocation
of attention (i.e., prevent operators from devoting all of their
available attention to the primary task in order to attend to other
stimuli in the environment) to the extent required to ameliorate
inattentional blindness with complex, dynamic stimuli. Braun [38]
found that task experience can attenuate the effects of manipu-
lations designed to impair basic processes underlying detection.
Although task experience may facilitate a link between preatten-
tive processing and perceptual report in a basic detection task –
improving detection without reducing attentional load – this
finding did not generalize to, or this mechanism was not strong
enough to ameliorate detection deficits for, this more complex
task. Although Drew et al.’s [37] findings also suggested improved
detection for experienced operators, their overall pattern of
findings prompted them to note that ‘‘… expertise does not
immunize against inherent limitations of human attention and
perception’’.
From an applied perspective, demonstrating that experience
monitoring security footage did not protect operators against this
basic cognitive deficit highlights the robustness of the effect and its
relevance for applied security contexts (see also [37]). Further, it
highlights the importance of investigating the influence of human
factors on effective security monitoring: Simply having an operator
(experienced or not) monitor a collection of CCTV screens does
not guarantee effective threat detection or enhanced public safety.
Contrary to expectations, task length did not affect inattentional
blindness. Previous research has only investigated inattentional
blindness during sequences which require attention over relatively
short time periods (approx. one minute). However, in a variety of
other detection tasks, operators’ detection rates have been shown
to drop over time (e.g., [8,29]). Thus, the absence of any effect in
the present study is surprising. However, the footage added prior
to the critical event (to create the longer clips) was monotonous,
and may have permitted effective performance with minimal
vigilance. Participants viewing the longer versions of the footage
may have reduced their vigilance over time, but re-focused their
attention at the start of the critical event. Although this may not be
an optimal manipulation of sustained attention, it approximates
operationally-relevant monitoring conditions [31].
Alternatively, inattentional blindness may be independent of the
length of time for which an individual has been attentive, and
simply reflect the direction of attention towards another object,
task or event at the time the unexpected stimulus appears.
Increasing (decreasing) the total amount of attentional resources
available when the unexpected stimulus appears will not reduce
(increase) inattentional blindness if all of these resources remain
directed toward the primary task [27]. The present findings extend
previous research on inattentional blindness by suggesting that task
length (i.e., the length of time for which attention is required) per se
does not affect inattentional blindness. Consistent with previous
work (e.g., [15]) our findings suggest that, even for experienced
operators, prolonged monitoring periods are not a necessary
precondition for substantial inattentional blindness effects.
Verbalization vs. Recall Based Measures of Inattentional
Blindness, and Criteria for Detection
Inattentional blindness is typically measured using a post-event
questionnaire. We compared detection rates based on a typical
post-event questionnaire with a novel measure based on partic-
ipants’ real-time verbalizations. While researchers have argued
against a memory-based mechanism for inattentional blindness
[15], we believed that the method used to assess detection may
contribute to detection rates. Specifically, given the established
fallibility of recall memory [44], we were concerned that relying on
participants’ recall of the event (i.e., using post-event question-
naires to measure detection) implicitly introduces a memory
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confound, and may inflate inattentional blindness rates. The
results did not support this position. However, our results did
demonstrate that the method used to measure detection affected
inattentional blindness rates – albeit in the opposite direction to
predictions based on the inattentional amnesia hypothesis [40].
Specifically, inattentional blindness rates based on the post-event
questionnaire were lower than those based on participants’ real-
time verbalizations. Care was taken to ensure that the question-
naires used were not suggestive, and information contained in the
questionnaire items was not sufficient to allow participants who
had not detected the unexpected stimulus to pass the strict
criterion for detection. Thus, we do not believe the increased
detection rates merely reflect suggestive questioning. However,
questionnaire items may have served as recall cues, facilitating
participants’ memories for the event, and their reporting of the
unexpected stimuli. Alternatively, detection rates based on real-
time verbalizations may have been lower than those based on the
post-event questionnaire because participants experienced diffi-
culty verbalizing the critical event and the unexpected target
simultaneously. However, approximately 40% of participants were
able to offer a verbalization corresponding to the appearance of
the unexpected target, so difficulties associated with concurrent
verbalization do not wholly account for the effect. The precise
mechanism for this effect is unclear. However, by using a novel,
non-memory based index of detection, our results clearly
demonstrate that inattentional blindness is a perceptual or
attentional deficit, not a product of memory failure [15].
Further to the differences in detection rates based on
verbalization and post-event recall data, our data suggested that
a number of participants detected the unexpected stimulus but
failed to correctly describe/identify it (in both their verbalizations
and their post-event recall responses). We used high quality, color
clips so these errors are unlikely to reflect the quality of visual
information available. This finding has two additional implica-
tions. First, although the present research is concerned with
inattentional blindness (i.e., detection failures), identification
failures are also relevant for security monitoring settings (the
ability to not only detect a stimulus, but to identify it and describe
it is of obvious practical importance). Instances of detection
without identification based on post-event measures may, at least
partially, reflect the nature of the questioning. Questions such as
‘‘While you were watching the footage, did you notice anything
unusual?’’ may have encouraged participants to confabulate a
positive response. Such an effect would be trivial. However, this is
not true for the real-time verbalization measure. Teasing apart
detection and identification failures, and understanding the
conditions contributing to these two types of error will be
important in improving monitoring performance.
Second, from a purely methodological perspective, our results
demonstrate that when studying inattentional blindness the choice
of measurement method and criterion imposed for detection are
important. The precise mechanisms underlying inattentional
blindness are debatable (see [45]) and, as demonstrated by the
present results, failures to report unexpected events may be
interpreted as indicating a form of blindness (failure to perceive or
detect) or a form of agnosia (a failure to recognize or identify, see
[46]) depending on the methodology used. That design and
measurement choices affected outcomes is not surprising, but it is a
reminder that methodological and analytical choices should reflect
the theoretical and applied contexts motivating the research.
Further, the method of measurement used and the level of
specificity required to constitute detection must be clearly
operationalized in research of this nature.
From an applied perspective, there are important distinctions
between our testing environment and a typical CCTV control
room. In applied settings, observers are often required to monitor
several screens simultaneously. Moreover, surveillance systems
often produce poor quality images which in turn contribute to
difficulties detecting and identifying stimuli [8]. Our participants
monitored a single screen with a high quality image. Nonetheless,
most participants – even those with experience monitoring security
footage – demonstrated substantial inattentional blindness. Dem-
onstrating robust effects under near-optimal conditions, with both
naı¨ve and experienced operators, highlights the relevance of the
issue for applied settings (where image quality is poorer and
multiple screens require attention).
In the current social-political climate, effective security surveil-
lance is essential for public safety, and the protection of critical
infrastructure. However, there has been little academic interest in
CCTV monitoring despite its obvious role in security settings
[9,47]. A scientific approach to security surveillance research is
required, and such an approach must consider human factors in
addition to technical capacity. Knowledge gained from such
research may influence the design of monitoring systems, and the
training given to operators [48]. The present study contributes to
this approach by empirically investigating inattentional blindness
in the security monitoring context, demonstrating the robustness
of the phenomenon, and highlighting important theoretical and
practical issue for further investigation.
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